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Abstract 
There is a renewed interest in whether land reforms can contribute to market development in Africa and whether 
land reforms can be pro-poor. This paper uses unique household panel data from Tigray region in Ethiopia to 
assess the impact of the 1998 low-cost land registration and certification reform on land rental market 
participation over a period of eight years after the reform, using random effects probit and tobit panel data 
models for land leased out and leased in, while correcting for unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity of 
having certificate. The analysis revealed that the land reform contributed to increased land rental market 
participation. Female-headed households became more willing to rent out land and making land available for 
more efficient producers. Average areas leased out and leased in increased after certification. The land rental 
market remained characterised with significant and non-convex transaction costs also after the reform as 
evidenced by significant state dependence, a low response to own holding size and a high share of non-
participation in the land market, leaving room for further improvement.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
New Land Reforms are again high on the global development agenda as illustrated by the 
recent establishment of a (High Level) Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. 
Another evidence is the large expansion in the number of land reform projects funded by the 
World Bank; from 3 projects in FY 1990-94 to 19 (US$0.7 billion) and 25 (US$1 billion) in 
the 1995-99 and 2000-2004 periods (WB, 2006). Yet the empirical evidence on impacts of 
land reforms is mixed and there exist very few rigorous studies assessing their impacts. 
 
We are aware of only two studies that have attempted to use the recently developed high 
quality impact assessment methods2 to assess such impacts of land reforms. One is a study in 
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Peru (Field and Torero, 2003) but the methodology in this study is also questioned (Mitchell, 
2005). The other is a study in Mexico (Finan et al., 2005) who found that access to even a 
small plot of land can raise the household welfare substantially. Such methods have their 
limitations, however, when it comes to measuring economy-wide effects. In this paper we aim 
to assess the impacts of a broad land reform in form of a land registration and certification 
program that covered more than 80% of the rural farm households in Tigray, Ethiopia, within 
a period of about one year in 1998-99. We want to assess the impacts on the functioning of 
the land rental market in a country where all land is owned by the state but where individual 
households are given user rights, and rights to rent, inherit and bequeth the land. Such impacts 
are not likely to be there only for those who received certificates but also for others because of 
the economy-wide nature of the program and that we look at an economy-wide effect. 
Households without certificates after the reform may therefore not represent the adequate 
counterfactual in our analysis even if such households were randomly assigned as non-
recipients of certificates.  
 
We are advantaged to have a unique panel data set covering 400 households in 16 
communities in Tigray, where the first round survey was carried out one year (1997-98) 
before the land registration and certification took place, with three follow-up survey rounds 
about two, five and eight years after the land reform.  
 
We apply random effects probit and tobit panel data models controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, state dependence and other exogenous variables to assess the impacts of the 
exogenously introduced reform program. Our analysis reveals a highly significant and 
positive effect of the land reform on land rental market participation and degree of 
participation on the tenant side of the market. On the landlord side of the market female-
headed households with land certificates increased the land they rented out after the reform 
while the area they rented out decreased significantly over time after the reform for the same 
female-headed households.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We give an overview of the Ethiopian land 
policy changes over time in part two, followed by a theoretical model in part three. We 
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present the methodology and data in part four and the results in part five, followed by our 
conclusions.   
 
2. The Ethiopian land policy: A brief historical overview and recent 
reforms 
Civil war and border conflicts have had a severe negative impact on the development of 
Ethiopia and land disputes and land policies have played a central role in these disputes. A 
military regime (Derg) took power from Haile Sellassie in 1974 and made all land state 
property. The regime followed up with frequent land redistributions and land allocation based 
on family size was practiced to maintain an egalitarian land distribution (Holden and 
Yohannes 2002, Rahmato 1984). After a long civil war in northern Ethiopia, the military 
government was overthrown and a new government formed in 1991. Eritrea was separated out 
and a more market-friendly policy introduced. Some authority was devolved from the federal 
to the regional governments. This was also the case for land policies where a new federal land 
proclamation was introduced in 1995 and followed up by regional land proclamations at 
different points in time after that allowing for some variation in the land laws across regions 
as long as these did not violate the federal land law.  
 
The Tigray Region started a land certification process in 1998-99 and used simple traditional 
methods in the implementation. More than 80% of the population in the region had received 
land certificates when the process was interrupted by the war with Eritrea. This was at the 
time a unique large-scale low-cost approach that may set a new standard for land reforms 
which involves much lower costs than the traditional piecemeal high-tech approach that has 
dominated in most countries until recently (Deininger et al., 2007). The approach gives hopes 
that also the poor may benefit from land reforms while they most often have been excluded in 
countries where the high-cost high-tech methods have been used. This is therefore an 
excellent opportunity to study some of the benefits and weaknesses of this low-cost approach.  
 
Other regions in Ethiopia have already learnt from the Tigray experience and have started to 
implement similar land registration and certification programs (ibid.). The Amhara Region 
started land registration and certification in 2003 with some donor support and used and tested 
more modern equipment. The Oromia and Southern Regions started very recently (2004) and 
the process is not yet completed in the latter three regions. The variation in the methods of the 
reforms across regions and communities gives excellent opportunities for research that can 
give useful insights about costs and benefits of alternative low-cost reform designs. The 
lessons from Ethiopia may also be highly relevant in some other poor countries characterised 
by high land pressure, tenure insecurity, severe rural poverty and land degradation (Deininger, 
et al., 2007).  
 
Even though the land reforms in Ethiopia have contributed to an egalitarian land distribution, 
land rental markets are very active and are dominated by sharecropping arrangements (Teklu 
and Lemi, 2004; Holden and Ghebru, 2005; Bezabih and Holden, 2006; Pender and 
Fafchamps, 2006; Tadesse et al., Forthcoming).  
 
Important policy concerns are whether the land reform in form of registration and certification 
has contributed to increased tenure security, espescially for the poor, including women. 
Anecdotal evidence from Tigray (MUT, 2003; Haile et al., 2005), that women think 
differently about their land certificates than men do as their tenure rights have been less 
secure than that of men, and the certificates may therefore have a higher value to them than 
they have to men. Men on the other hand may be more concerned about defending their plot 
borders and the certificates have little added value for that purpose since they do not contain 
any map of the plots. Furthermore, the cultural rule against women cultivating their land 
cause single women to depend on assistance from men or renting out or sharecropping out 
their land. This cultural taboo causes female-headed households in Tigray to be landlords and 
among the poorest of the poor (MUT 2003). Having a certificate may thus have strengthened 
the bargaining power of these female-headed households in the land rental market and this 
may have a poverty-reduction effect. 
 
Another hypothesis forwarded by MUT (2003) was that certificates may be more important 
for old owners who may have received their land long time ago and therefore may have fewer 
witnesses to back up their land rights. In general, landowners will also tend to be older in 
villages where it is a long time since the last land redistribution. Old owners may also be less 
able to efficiently cultivate the land themselves. A land certificate may make them more 
willing to rent out their land because they feel more tenure secure. 
 
Ghebru and Holden (Ghebru and Holden, Forthcoming) and Holden and Ghebru (2005) found 
considerable variation in the extent of market participation in land rental market across 
communities using a data Tigray from 2003 (part of the data used in this study). The land 
rental market therefore appeared to be characterised by substantial transaction costs and 
asymmetries due to rationing on the tenant side. Many tenants and potential tenants failed to 
rent in as much land as they wanted to (Ghebru and Holden, Forthcoming). A large share of 
the contracts was among kin and kinship ties appeared to improve access to land in the market 
(Holden and Ghebru, 2005). Another study in the Amhara region of Ethiopia (Deininger et al., 
Forthcoming) also found signs of high transaction costs in the land rental market. Similarly, 
Tikabo, Holden and Bergland found significant transaction costs in the land rental market in 
Eritrea (Tikabo et al., 2007).  
 
MUT(2003) suggested that land certificates may not be important for land rental contracts and 
found no sign of changes in the land rental markets due to certificates. Their qualitative 
evidence from tenants indicated that tenants did not care whether the landowner has a 
certificate or not. What was more important was that they could trust the other party. With 
trust the certificate is unimportant. They also made the point that high enforcement costs may 
reduce the value of the certificate as an instrument to enforce contracts through the social 
court. Our data allow us to make quantitative assessments of whether certificates enhance the 
land rental market. Trust and enforcement possibilities are clearly important determinants of 
the transaction costs and have implications for the extent to which land certification can 
enhance the allocative efficiency of the land rental market. 
3. Theoretical model 
Early studies of transaction costs and adjustment in the land rental market include Bliss and 
Stern (Bliss and Stern, 1982), Bell and Susangkarn (Bell and Sussangkarn, 1988) and 
Skoufias (Skoufias, 1995). We develop theoretical models of landlord and tenant behaviour in 
the land rental market taking tenure insecurity and transaction costs into account. We build on 
Fafchamps (Fafchamps, 2004) and Holden and Ghebru (2005). Transaction costs in the land 
rental market are a function of tenure security that again depends on trust and the current and 
past land policies. This implies that transaction costs may be nonconvex in emerging markets 
where trust-based trade relationships among partners tend to develop gradually(Fafchamps, 
2004). Past trade experience as landlord or tenant may therefore matter for current market 
access and degree of participation (Holden and Ghebru, 2005). This could be due to trust as 
well as reputation effects. This also implies that we should expect to find state dependency 
when analysing panel data from such market participation. 
 Landlord model 
We start by outlining the landlord model in a land rental market dominated by 
sharecropping. For simplicity we assume that the household maximises expected income (y) 
from production on own land, rental income from rented out land (R) and off-farm activity.  
The landlord household has a fixed endowment of land ( LA ) and non-land resources ( LN ). 
The non-land resources may be used in farm production or to generate off-farm income 
(wNw). The landlord gets a share (1 α− ) of the output (q). Production risk may be one of the 
important reasons for sharecropping but we ignore this type of risk for the moment and focus 
only on the risk related to tenure insecurity. Furthermore, we assume that land and non-land 
resources are complements in agricultural production. We use the standard assumptions for 
the production functions; , , 0, , , 0, , , , 0A R N AA RR NN AN RN NA NRq q q q q q q q q q> < > . The transaction 
costs in the land rental market are captured by a transaction cost function which implicitely 
captures trust and tenure insecurity which are a function of past and current land policies, 
earlier trade experience, landlord characteristics, and community characteristics. The 
transaction cost function, c(.), is assumed to be non-decreasing in area rented out (Rt ) and 
decreasing with earlier trade experience (Rt-n). Tenure insecurity may increase or decrease 
with past and current land policies such as land redistribution, restictions on land renting, and 
land registration and certification interventions. Knowledge of new land policies may be 
imperfect and old policies may have an impact long after they have been officially stopped. 
Such policies may therefore affect the perceived tenure security and consequent expected 
costs and benefits of land renting. The expected income maximisation problem of the landlord 
is represented in equation (1) below where subscript t represents current time period, 
superscript L represents landlord, supercript T represents tenant, superscript V represents 
village, and superscript W represents off-farm income-generating activity3. Tenure security is 
a consequence of past policies and is represented by 
t
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The first order condition for area rented out becomes; 
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Using the implicit function theorem it is trivial to show that area rented out will decrease with 
increasing transaction cost. Tenure insecurity due to land policies, like frequent land 
redistributions or restrictions on land renting, or lack of trust in tenants, are therefore likely to 
reduce willingness to rent out land. On the other hand, previous trade experience with tenants 
and policies that enhance tenure security, like land registration and certification is meant to 
do, should stimulate land rental activity, How quickly this effect appears depends on the 
speed of the dissemination of information and the trust in the government. These effects are 
also conditioned by observable and unobservable landlord ( Lz ) and village ( Vz ) 
characteristics.  
 
However trivial this is theoretically it is of high policy relevance related to the new land 
policy reforms that sweep over many countries in Africa and other parts of the world. We are 
not aware of any other studies that have been able to utilise household panel data in this way 
to test the dynamic effects of a land reform on land rental market activity. 
 
Tenant model 
Based on the landlord model and empirical studies(Ghebru and Holden, Forthcoming) it is 
possible that tenants are rationed in the land rental market. This may be due to the 
sharecropping system that causes the land rental market not to have a price that clears the 
market. Likewise tenure insecurity and imperfect information about tenants may cause 
landlords to be cautious in their land renting-out decisions. Trust, reputation and earlier 
experience with tenants may therefore be important for their access. Likewise, alternative 
policies and policy reforms may affect tenants’ degree of access to land in the land rental 
market. This means that we do not assume that tenants in general are able to rent in an optimal 
amount given their own resource situation. Based on Holden and Ghebru (2005) we assume 
that the tenants’ access to land in the rental market may be formulated as follows; 
( ) , , , ; ,t tT TL TL TL T T TLTL TL P T Vt t t t t ntt t t t
L L
R R c R c c A N R dt dt z zψ
−
−ϒ −Γ
Ρ
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This equation says that a tenant’s access to land is a function of the transaction costs (c) that 
consist of a minimum irreducable component ( c ) and a part that depends on the land and non-
land resources of the tenant, earlier participation in the land rental market ( t TLt nR dt−
−ϒ∫ ), and 
past and present land policy mixes ( t Pt dtψ
−Γ
Ρ
∑∫ ) which may pull in different directions and 
have lagged effects. The access is also conditional on other observable and unobservable 
tenant characteristics (e.g. sex of household head) and village characteristics. 
 
The models highlight that policy effects tend to be dynamic and may depend on past and 
initial conditions. They allow us to test the following hypotheses: 
H1. Land rental market participation has increased after the land registration and 
certification (because land certificates have increased the feeling of tenure security among 
landlords, making them more willing to rent out their land). 
H2. There is state dependence in the land rental market such that lagged market 
participation has a positive effect on later market participation. This may be due to the 
non-convex nature of the transaction costs (Fafchamps 2004).  
H3. Female landlords that received certificates are likely to rent out more land after the 
reform (due to increased tenure security).  
H4. Older landowners depend more on the certificates as a proof of their ownership, 
causing old landowners with certificates to be more willing to rent out their land (due to 
higher tenure security) (MUT 2003).  
H5. Access to land in the land rental market has improved for tenants after the reform 
(follows if landlords have become more willing to rent out). 
H6a. The effect of the reform is gradual and the full effect only comes after many years 
(lack of trust and information about potential partners cause cautious and gradual 
involvement in the market) (Fafchamps 2004) vs. 
H6b. There is a non-linear effect of the reform on land rental market participation with 
strong initial effect (diminishing effect over time). 
H7. Households that initially participated more in the land rental market and received 
certificates responded less than others that received certificates (because they already were 
more likely to have trusted partners and therefore face lower transaction costs). 
H8. Land rental market activity increased most in communities with low share of 
participating households in the land rental market before the land reform 
H9. Having a land certificate had a more positive effect on land market participation in 
villages with low initial land rental market activity. 
H10. Land rental market participation increased more over time in villages with low initial 
paticipation in the land rental market (due to higher transaction cost-reducing potential of 
the reforms in villages where activity was initially low). 
We will come back to how we wanted to test these hypotheses in part 4.2. below. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Econometric approach 
We used dynamic panel data models with binary and censored response variables and 
included controls for unobserved heterogeneity. We used probit form for the binary land 
rental market participation models and incorporated a lagged dependent variable along with 
strictly exogenous variables with standard random effects (Wooldridge 2005). 
 
The dynamic probit model may be specified as follows; 
( ) ( )
, 1 0 , 11 | ,..., , ,it i t i i i it i t iP y y y z c z y cγ ρ− −= = Φ + +  
where y is the dependent variable conditioned on the lagged dependent variables, exogenous 
variables (zi) and unobserved household heterogeneity (ci). The unobserved heterogeneity is 
assumed to be additive inside the standard normal distribution function ( Φ ) (ibid.).  
 
The model allows us to test for state dependence. Previous participation in the land rental 
market may matter for current participation and the intial condition before the land reform 
may also affect the response. 
 
The unobserved heterogenous effect may be written as (Wooldridge 2005) 
0 1 0 2i i i ic y zα α α α= + + +  
In this way the unobserved effect is modeled on the initial condition and exogenous variables 
to get a likelihood function that does not depend on the unobserved individual effects. This 
allows use of a likelihood function that has the same structure as the standard random effects 
probit model except that the explanatory variables at time period t are 
{ }
, 1 01, , , ,it it i t i ix z y y z−=  
It is possible to include interactions between 0  and i iy z provided the model is linear in 
parameters. 
 
The dynamic Tobit model with unobserved effects is specified as follows (Wooldridge, 2005); 
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for t=1,2,..,T time periods and i=1,2,…,N households in the cross-section. The g(.) function is 
formulated to allow the effect of lagged y to be different depending on whether it was a corner 
solution or not. Wooldridge (ibid.) has shown how to obtain root-N-consistent estimates of the 
parameters. The model may be used to obtain average partial effects. 
 
The dynamic corner solution model with unobserved heterogenous effects for land rented in 
or rented out can be modelled as a random effects tobit model where the explanatory variables 
at time t are 
{ }
, 1 0, , ,it it i t i ix z g r z−=  
where ( ) ( )
, 1 , 1 0 0 and i t i t i ig g y r r y− −= = . The latent variable model may be written as 
*
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The analysis requires balanced panel data. Unbalanced panel data would require estimation of 
a different conditional distribution of ci for each configuration of the missing data that may be 
feasible for balanced sub-panels when there is no selection bias.  
We calculated average partial effects (APEs) from the tobit models as; 
[ ] ( )|1 1 /ii ji
ij
APE E y X
APE X
N N x N
β σ β ∂ = = = Φ ∂  
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Standard errors for APEs were calculated as; 
( )( )( ) | | /jSE APE Var Xβ β σ= Φ  
4.2. Data and variable inclusion 
We use a unique household panel data set from Tigray in northern Ethiopia, which consists of 
400 households in 16 different communities. These communities are a subsample of 
communities included in an IFPRI community and household survey and covers the main 
variation in agroclimatic, market access and population densities in the highlands in the 
region. The households have been surveyed four times, covering the years 1997/98, 2000/01, 
2002/03 and 2005/06 while land certification was implemented in all communities in 1998/99. 
 
The requirement that all households need to be included in all years (balanced panel) reduced 
the sample size to close to 300 households. Dependent variables in the analyses are dummy 
variables for participation in the land rental market as landlords or tenants and land area 
rented out or rented in. Lagged dependent variables and initial year participation was included 
to deal with the initial conditions problem (Wooldridge 2005). Variable names and 
descriptions are presented in Table 1. 
 
Hypothesis H1 is simply tested by assessing whether the probability and degree of 
participation in the land rental market by landlords has increased significantly over time and 
by assessing whether possession of land certificates was significantly and positively 
correlated with the probability and degree of participation in the land rental market.  
Furthermore, year dummies were included for the years after the land registration and 
certification to test whether market participation has increased after the reform. Although the 
land registration and certification can be seen as an exogenous policy change, we cannot be 
sure that receiving a land certificate at household level is totally random. We therefore used 
all available household and village characteristics to predict the “having a certificate” variable 
at household level (landcerp). 
 
We tested hypothesis H2 by including the lagged dependent variables in the probit as well as 
tobit models while also controlling for unobservables by inclusion of the initial market 
participation and other exogenous variables. The same was done in the landlord-side and the 
tenant-side of the market. 
 
Our hypothesis H3 was that the certificates increased the tenure security of (potential) female 
landlords such that they would become relatively more willing to rent out their land after the 
reform. We included sex of household head (hhsex) to test for gender differences in market 
participation and an interaction variable for sex of household head and the predicted having a 
land certificate (hhsexcerp) to assess whether female headed households receiving land 
certificates changed their land rental market participation. An interaction variable for sex of 
household head and years since certification (hhsexcrtyr) was included to assess how land 
rental market activity has a different pattern over time after the reform for female-headed 
households than for male-headed households.  
 
To assess hypothesis H4, whether older households increased their market participation as 
landlords if they had certificates (because it increased their tenure security), we included an 
interacton variable (hhagecerp) between household age (age of head of household) and 
having a certificate (predicted). Our hypothesis indicates that its sign should be positive in the 
landlord model.  
 
Testing of tenants’ access and participation in the land rental market (H5) is following the 
same approach as for H1 in the probit and tobit models.  
 
To test for a non-linear effect of the reform (hypotheses H6a and H6b) we tried alternative 
approaches, including year dummies and a variable representing the number of years since the 
reform was implemented (certyears) and another being the square of this variable (certyear2). 
With this latter formulation we dropped the year dummies for the last two periods due to 
collinearity problems. The second year dummy was included to test for the initial effect of the 
reform.  
 
Hypothesis H7 was tested by including the interaction variable between initial land market 
participation and having a land certificate (llot0cerp=llot0*landcerp and 
llit0cerp=llit0*landcerp).  
 
Hypothesis H8 was tested by either including the share of households initially participating in 
the land rental market (villrmpart) or a dummy variable for villages with a share of more than 
35% of the households participating in the land rental market (villrmpd=1 if villrmpart>0.35 
and zero otherwise). Finally, we tested hypothesis H9 by including an interaction variable 
(vilpdcrtyr=villrmpd*certyears). Several models had to be run to test the alternative 
hypotheses and to assess the robustness of the results with alternative specifications. 
 
We also included a dummy variable for the communities that were most affected by the war 
with Eritrea in the second and third period (2000/01 and 2002/03). We expect the war to have 
had a negative effect on the land rental market. There is also a risk that the war has had a 
more widespread negative effect that could have reduced or delayed the effect of the land 
reform on land rental market development.    
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
We present key summary statistics in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2 we see the change over time 
for key household level variables. We see that the percentage of households that rented in 
land (tent) increased from 8% in 1997 to 30.5% in 2000 and then down to 27.9 and 26.5% in 
2003 and 2006. The percentage of households renting out land (llord) increased from 23.7% 
in 1997 to 26.9% in 2000 and to 26 and 28.8% in 2003 and 2006. This seems to support our 
hypotheses H1 and H5. There appeared to be a stronger initial effect on the tenant side than 
on the landlord side but since the overall participation in the local land rental markets should 
be a zero-sum game, the dynamic pattern is not quite clear from our sample. The mean area 
leased in increased from 0.18 tsimdi4 in 1997 to 0.77 tsimdi in 2000 and then down to 0.71 
and 0.52 tsimdi in 2003 and 2006. Average area leased out increased from 0.52 tsimdi in 1997 
to 0.73 tsimdi in 2000, 0.79 in 2003 and down to 0.74 tsimdi in 2006. The percentage of the 
households with certificate increased from 0 in 1997 to 95.1% in 2000 and to 98.5% in 2003 
and declined to 88.6% in 2006. The reason for the reduction may be that some households 
have lost their certificate or due to inheritance (change in head of household) that also may 
have involved a subdivision of the land holding without receiving new certificate. The share 
of households that are female-headed increased from 12.5% in 1997 to 30.5% in 2006. 
 
Table 3 characterises the households that either participate in the land market as landlords or 
tenants or do not participate in the land market and whether the characteristics have changed 
over time. We see that landlord households are significantly poorer in oxen, other livestock 
(tlu), male labour and female labour than tenants and households not participating in the land 
rental market, while they are not poorer in terms of land endowment (own_hold). Similarly 
tenant households were richer than nonpartipating households in oxen, other livestock and 
male labour endowment but not in female labour endowment while their land endowment was 
slightly higher. This pattern remained fairly stable over the years the data covered.  
 
5.2. Land reform and participation in the land rental market 
We present the results of the land rental market participation probit models in Table 4. These 
are the results of probit random effects models testing for state dependence (hypothesis H2) 
while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. We first look at the landlord (lease out) 
participation model. We see that the lagged market participation variable (llord_t1) is highly 
significant and positive indicating the presence of state dependence, in line with hypothesis 
H2. Earlier market participation as landlords is strongly correlated with being a landlord in 
later periods. When it comes to the land reform-related variables, we see that the predicted 
land certificate variable was significant at 5% level and with a positive sign. Households with 
                                                 
4
 One tsimdi is approximately 0.25 ha and is the area of land that a pair of oxen can cultivate in a day. 
certificate were more likely to rent out their land than households without certificate. This is 
in line with hypothesis H1.  
 
Female-headed households and households with older heads of household were significantly 
(at 5 and 10% levels) more likely to rent out their land, while more educated households and 
households with more oxen were significantly (at 10 and 1% levels) less likely to rent out 
their land. Households with larger land endowment were significantly (at 0.1% level) more 
likely to rent out their land. The linear and quadratic years with certificate variables were 
significant at 10% level with negative and positive signs.  
 
When we look at the tenant (land lease in) probit model (Table 4) we see that also here the 
lagged variable (tent_t0) was highly significant (0.1% level) and had a positive sign 
demonstrating again the state dependence in the land rental market (hypothesis H2). Oxen 
ownership, other livestock and education had significant (1%, 10% and 5% levels) and 
positive effects on market participation while female-headed households and households with 
older household heads were significantly (0.1% and 10% levels) less likely to rent in land. 
Own farm size had no significant effect on the probability of leasing in land while this 
variable was highly significant in the landlord model.    
 
5.2. Land reform and degree of participation in the land rental market 
The results of the household random effects tobit panel data models with state dependence, 
and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, are presented in Tables 5 for the landlord side 
and in Table 6 for the tenant side. 
 
Land leased out models 
In order to test all our hypotheses and assess the robustness of the findings we specified four 
alternative models without and with different interaction variables. The first model (Lease out 
1) is without interaction variables. The second model (Lease out 2) contains interaction 
variables between sex of household head and having certificate (hhsexcerp), sex of household 
head and years with certificate (hhsexcrtyr), and between age of household head and having 
certificate (hhagecerp). The third model (Lease out 3) contains interaction variables for initial 
year participation and having certificate (llot0cerp), for initial year participation and years 
with certificate (llot0crtyrs), and for share of village participating initially times having 
certificate (vilcerp). The squared years with certificate variable was taken out and replaced 
with year dummies for 2003 and 2006. The forth model (Lease out 4) is different from the 
previous model by having replaced the the village share of households initially participating 
in the land rental market (villrmpart) with the initial household land rental market 
participation times years with certificate variable (llot0crtyr), a dummy for villages with high 
initial land rental market participation (villrmpd), and an interaction variable for the last 
variable and years with certificate (vilpdcrtyr).  
 
We see from the Lease out 1 and Lease out 2 models in Table 5 that the sex of household 
head was highly significant and with a positive sign in both models, having land certificate 
(landcerp) was significant at 10% level only in the first model and insignificant in the second, 
while the interaction variable between sex of household head and having certificate 
(hhsexcerp) was significant at 5% level and with a positive sign. We interpret this a support in 
favour of hypotheses H1 and H3; land certificates have stimulated landlords to rent out more 
land and this is more the case for female-headed households than for male-headed 
households. This finding is also supported by additional perception data that we have from the 
2006 round survey which indicated that land certification has contributed to strengthen 
women’s land rights, making them more willing to rent out land, and increasing their 
bargaining power in the land rental market. Also the interaction variable between sex of 
household head and years with certificate (hhsexcrtyr) was significant and with a negative 
sign. This means that although female household have increased their renting out activity, the 
amount of land they rent out has declined over time after the first initial increase. Further 
analysis is required to investigate the reasons for this. One possibility is that their welfare may 
have improved following the reform and they may then have become more able to farm the 
land themselves or they have become less dependent on and exposed to coersion by their in-
law tenants (Holden and Bezabih, Forthcoming). 
 
To test hypothesis H4 that certificates increase tenure security of old households and therefore 
their willingness rent out land we can look at the results for the variable (hhagecerp) in Land 
lease model 2 in Table 5. The variable was significant at 5% level and had a positive sign in 
line with our hypothesis H4. It appears therefore that the certificates have made female-
headed and old household heads more willing to rent out their land, probably because the 
certificates have made them more tenure secure. This fits also with the anecdotal evidence 
(MUT 2003) and our perception data from 2006. 
 
We see that the lagged dependent variable, lagged area leased out (llo_t1), was highly 
significant and positive, demonstrating the importance of state dependence in the land rental 
market (hypothesis H2). This is the case also after we have controlled for unobserved 
heterogeneity by including the initial period land leased out area (llo_t0), which also is highly 
significant in all model specifications. We included the farm size (own_hold) variable, which 
usually is used to test for allocative efficiency of land rental markets (Bliss and Stern 1982; 
Skoufias 1995). With efficient adjustment this coefficient should be equal to +1. As can be 
seen we find the coefficient to be about 0.17 and significantly (at 0.1% level) different from 0 
but also significantly smaller than +1. This together with the significant state dependence 
illustrates that landlords face significant transaction costs in the market. 
 
The initial condition variables were highly significant in all the models and should control for 
unobservable household heterogeneity. The variables may, however, also have an observable 
effect that admittedly is confounded with the unobservable effect and therefore requires 
cautious interpretation. Relying on the assumption of linearity in parameters, we also 
introduced in the Lease out 3 model in Table 5 the interaction variable for initial market 
participation and receiving a certificate (llot0cerp). We found then that households that 
initially rented out land and had received a certificate were renting out significantly (0.1% 
level) less land after they received the certificates. This may mean that households already in 
the market benefitted less from the certificate than others because they already had market 
access and more trustworthy partners (supporting hypothesis H7).  
 
 
Our hypothesis H8 stated that land rental market activity increased most in communities with 
low share of participating households in the land rental market before the land reform. We 
used the villrmpart and villrmpd variables in the Lease out 3 and 4 models respectively to test 
it. We found somewhat surprisingly that both variables were significant and with a positive 
sign, causing us to reject hypothesis H8. This seems to imply that land rental market 
participation improved more in communities with higher level of initial participation. This 
result may also have implications for the next hypothesis, H9, which stated that having a land 
certificate had a more positive effect on land market participation in villages with low initial 
land rental market activity. We see from the Lease out 4 model that the villcerp variable was 
significant and with a positive sign, also rejecting our hypothesis 9. Having a certificate 
appeared to be more beneficial in communities with higher initial land rental market activity. 
Finally, we tested our hypothesis H10 that land rental market participation increased more 
over time in villages with low initial paticipation in the land rental market (due to higher 
transaction cost-reducing potential of the reforms in villages where activity was initially low). 
The sign of the vilcrtyr variable was negative and it was significant at 1% level in line with 
this hypothesis, signaling a declining effect of certification over time. We should, however, 
take the results of these interaction variables with a grind of salt as we rely on linearity 
assumptions. The AIC and BIC numbers in Table 5 also increase as we move from model 1 to 
4.  
 
We also see that oxen-ownership (oxen), male labour force (adumale) and education (hhedu) 
had negative effects on land leased-out. This implies that those who are poor in non-land 
resources rent out more land in line with findings in other studies in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(Tikabo et al., 2007; Deininger  et al., Forthcoming). 
 
Land leased in models 
The random effects tobit models for land leased in are presented in Table 6. Models 2 an 3 
have included additional interaction variables. Also here we find that the lagged dependent 
variable is highly significant (1% and 0.1% levels) and with positive sign, confirming the 
state dependence in line with the nonconvex transaction cost hypothesis (H2) that also implies 
that the land rental market is characterised by allocative inefficiency. This can also be seen by 
the parameter on the farm size variable (own_hold) being insignificant and close to zero.  
 
Having a land certificate appeared not to be important for tenants’ access to land to rent in. 
What is more important for access is ownership of oxen and other livestock (tlu) which were 
highly significant and contributed positively to area rented in while also education of 
household head had a positive effect but it was only significant at 10% level. On the other 
hand, female-headed households and households with old household heads rented in 
significantly less land. These households were more likely to be on the other side of the land 
rental market as we saw from the land lease out models. 
 
From the Lease in 2 and 3 models in Table 6 we see that households that initially participated 
in the market and received land certificates (the llit0cerp-variable) reduced significantly their 
land leased in as compared to other households, indicating that households that initially did 
not participate may have benefited more by getting better access.  
 The other interaction variables were not significant, except the interaction between initial 
leased in land and the number of years since certification (llit0crtyr) which only was 
significant at 10% level and with a positive sign, indicating an increasing trend in area rented 
in after certification. 
 
Overall we saw from Table 3 that tenants are wealthier in terms of endowments of non-land 
resources while they are not particularly land-poor or land-rich. Earlier market participation 
appears important for access to land in the land rental market, in line with the findings for 
other emerging markets in Africa where trust and reputation play important roles (Fafchamps 
2004). 
 
Average partial effects 
We calculated average partial effects (APEs) from the tobit models. The APEs for the land 
lease out and land lease in models (the first of the models in Tables 5 and 6) are presented in 
Tables 7 and 8. We see from Table 7 that the APE for land area leased out was 0.526 for 
having a land certificate vs. not having a land certificate for the whole sample, while the APE 
for area leased in was 0.209 for having vs. not having a certificate. For the continuous 
variables we also see that APEs for the lagged dependent variables (llo_t1 in Table 7 and 
lli_t1 in Table 8) were substantially higher than the APEs for own holding. This indicates that 
there are significant non-convex transaction costs in the land rental market and that the short-
term response to own holding is limited. It also appears that the APEs for the lagged 
dependent variable and own holding are higher in the lease out (landlord) model than in the 
lease in (tenant) model. This is also in line with the hypothesis that tenants are rationed in the 
market. 
 
To further look into the effects of land certificates over time we calculated the APEs of land 
certificate for land leased out for male vs. female-headed households that were participating 
in the land rental market or not and by year. The APEs are presented in Table 9. We see that 
the APEs are higher in the first year, higher for female-headed households than for male-
headed households and they are higher for households already participating in the market than 
for non-participants. This is also in line with the findings in the lease out models 2-4 in Table 
5 with the interaction variables for sex of household head, having land certificate, and earlier 
market participation. It is evident that female-headed households have become more willing 
to rent out their land and they tend to rent out more land when they have a certificate. This fits 
well with the hypothesis that a land certificate increases tenure security of landowners and 
they have therefore become more willing to rent out their land when their desired cultivated 
area is lower than their own holding. 
6. Conclusion 
Our analysis of the panel data from Tigray has demonstrated a significant and positive effect 
of the land registration and certification reform that took place in the late 1990s on the amount 
of activity in the land rental market. The reform appears to have reduced transaction costs in 
the land rental market by making potential landlords more willing to rent out their land. It has 
therefore also become easier for (potential) tenants to access land to rent in. This is likely to 
be caused by female-headed households who received land certificates feeling more tenure 
secure and have therefore become less reluctant to rent out their land.  
 
Recent changes in the land proclamation (law) imposing a restriction on the amount of land 
that households can lease out to maximum half of the land of households may become a threat 
to tenure security of poor households, like female-headed and old households, that lack the 
necessary non-land resources to farm their land efficiently. We recommend that this policy 
restriction is lifted because it is bad both for efficiency and equity.  
 
The analyses demonstrate that transaction costs in the land rental market remain high and 
there should be room for reducing these by facilitating transactions at the local level. Care 
should be exercised when reforming land rental markets, however, to make sure that the 
benefits from the reforms are higher than the costs. A system for voluntary registration of land 
rental contracts may be better than the system with compulsory registration of all land rental 
contracts that is now attempted imposed by law.
Table 1. Overview of variables used in the econometric analysis 
Variable 
name 
Variable description 
tent Participation as tentant in land rental market, 1=yes, 0=no 
tent_t1 Lagged participation in land rental market as tenant, 1=yes, 0=no 
tent_t0 Initial year participation in land rental market as tenant, 1=yes, 0=no 
llord Participation as landlord in land rental market, 1=yes, 0=no 
llord_t1 Lagged participation in land rental market as landlord, 1=yes, 0=no 
llord_t0 Initial year participation in land rental market as landlord, 1=yes, 0=no 
llo Land leased out (in tsimdi, one tsimdi=0.25 ha) 
lli Land leased in (tsimdi) 
llo_t1                                               Lagged land leased out 
llo_t0 Initial year (before land reform) land leased out 
lli_t1         Lagged land leased in 
lli_t0 Initial year land leased in 
landcert Household having land certificate, 1=yes, 0=no 
landcerp Predicted household having land certificate 
llot0cerp Interaction of initial year land leased out and predicted having land certificate 
llot0crtyr Interaction of initial year land leased out and years of having certificate 
llit0cerp   Interaction of initial year land leased in and predicted having land certificate 
llit0crtyr Interaction of initial year land leased in and years of having certificate 
hhsex Sex of household head, 1=female, 0=male 
hhsexcerp Interaction of sex of household head and predicted having land certificate 
hhsexcrtyr Interaction of sex of household head and years of having certificate 
conflict Dummy variable for communities close to the war zone during war with 
Etritrea, 1=conflict area, 0=otherwise 
hhedu Education of household head, 0=no eduction, 1=primary school, 
hhage Age of head of household, years 
hhagecerp Interaction of age of household head and predicted having land certificate 
adufem Number of adult females in household 
adumale Number of adult males in household 
tlu Tropical livestock units 
oxen Number of oxen 
d2000, 
d2003, d2006 
Dummies for years 
certyears Number of years since land certification was implemented 
certyear2 Square of number of years since land certification was implemented 
villrmpart Share of households in village initially participating in land rental market 
(1997-98) 
vilcerp Interaction variable for having certificate and living in village with high initial 
land rental market activity (villrmpart*landcerp) 
villrmpd Dummy variable=1 for villages with high initial land rental market activity 
(>35% participating), zero for other villages 
vilpdcrtyr Interaction variable for different dynamic effect in villages with high land 
rental market activity (villrmpd*certyears) 
             
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for key variables        
    year       tent     llord       lli       llo  landcert     hhsex      oxen       tlu  adufem   adumale  own_hold 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1997   .0811688   .237013  .1826299  .5154221         0   .127451  .9673203  1.713399 1.160131   1.24183  4.590723 
    2000   .3051948  .2694805  .7662886  .7237571  .9512987  .1140065  .7597403      1.75 1.276873  1.387622  4.555479 
    2003   .2792208  .2597403  .7090395  .7926136  .9854015   .262987  .8279221  2.544156 1.256494  1.311688  4.101607 
    2006   .2647059  .2875817  .5156291  .7389069  .8856209  .3056478  .9069767   2.83887 1.375415  1.415282  3.846889 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Total   .2325203  .2634146  .5434419  .6925998  .6973244  .2021277  .8650859  2.208831_ 1.266776  1.338789  4.274111_ 
 
    
 
Table 3. Summary statistics by year for key endowment variables of landlord, 
nonparticipant and tenant households.______________________________________ 
year = 1997 
tenure      stats       oxen       tlu   adumale    adufem  adulteql  own_hold 
Landlord     mean       0.58      1.07      1.03      1.20      3.83      4.72 
         se(mean)*      0.10      0.18      0.12      0.07      0.23      0.38 
Nonpart.     mean       1.04      1.78      1.29      1.16      4.25      4.39 
         se(mean)       0.06      0.12      0.06      0.04      0.12      0.40 
Tenant       mean       1.48      3.02      1.48      1.08      4.52      5.90 
         se(mean)       0.19      0.54      0.22      0.06      0.39      1.34 
Total        mean       0.97      1.71      1.24      1.16      4.18      4.59 
         se(mean)       0.05      0.11      0.05      0.03      0.11      0.31 
year = 2000 
Landlord     mean       0.36      0.91      1.06      1.22      4.02      4.65 
         se(mean)       0.07      0.14      0.12      0.08      0.25      0.36 
Nonpart.     mean       0.70      1.61      1.41      1.32      4.64      4.16 
         se(mean)       0.08      0.14      0.09      0.07      0.16      0.23 
Tenant       mean       1.17      2.64      1.62      1.27      5.13      5.06 
         se(mean)       0.11      0.25      0.10      0.07      0.19      0.38 
Total        mean       0.76      1.75      1.39      1.28      4.63      4.56 
         se(mean)       0.05      0.11      0.06      0.04      0.11      0.18 
year = 2003 
Landlord     mean       0.24      1.07      0.78      1.37      3.54      4.45 
         se(mean)       0.06      0.20      0.10      0.09      0.23      0.32 
Nonpart.     mean       0.75      2.27      1.32      1.34      4.56      3.81 
         se(mean)       0.06      0.19      0.08      0.07      0.16      0.18 
Tenant       mean       1.49      4.31      1.77      1.01      5.19      4.29 
         se(mean)       0.11      0.34      0.10      0.07      0.17      0.30 
Total        mean       0.83      2.54      1.31      1.26      4.48      4.10 
         se(mean)       0.05      0.16      0.06      0.05      0.11      0.15 
year = 2006 
Landlord     mean       0.43      1.53      1.01      1.12      3.60      4.23 
         se(mean)       0.08      0.23      0.13      0.09      0.23      0.30 
Nonpart.     mean       0.87      2.69      1.44      1.48      4.68      3.47 
         se(mean)       0.08      0.20      0.10      0.08      0.19      0.22 
Tenant       mean       1.45      4.43      1.77      1.45      5.32      4.12 
         se(mean)       0.10      0.40      0.12      0.08      0.20      0.35 
Total        mean       0.91      2.84      1.42      1.38      4.56      3.85 
         se(mean)       0.06      0.17      0.07      0.05      0.13      0.16 
* se(mean) is the standard error of the mean 
           
    
Table 4. Random effects panel probit models with unobserved  
heterogeneity and state dependence_______________________  
                   Lease Out      Lease In_______________                                        
llord_t1            1.250****                  
                   (0.13)                      
llord_t0            0.753****                  
                   (0.14)                      
tent_t1                              0.928**** 
                                    (0.13)     
tent_t0                              0.740**** 
                                    (0.18)     
landcerp            2.120**          1.084     
                   (1.05)           (0.96)     
conflict           -0.139           -0.066     
                   (0.14)           (0.13)     
hhsex               0.317**         -0.740**** 
                   (0.14)           (0.18)     
hhedu              -0.155*           0.144**   
                   (0.08)           (0.07)     
hhage               0.005*          -0.007*    
                   (0.00)           (0.00)     
adufem             -0.052           -0.150**   
                   (0.07)           (0.07)     
adumale            -0.088            0.088     
                   (0.06)           (0.05)     
oxen               -0.254***         0.238***  
                   (0.09)           (0.08)     
tlu                 0.004            0.056*    
                   (0.03)           (0.03)     
own_hold            0.042****       -0.009     
                   (0.01)           (0.02)     
d2000              -0.544            0.352     
                   (0.42)           (0.39)     
d2003     D   D 
d2006     D   D 
certyears          -0.684*          -0.058     
                   (0.36)           (0.33)     
certyear2           0.060*           0.007     
                   (0.03)           (0.03)     
_cons              -1.598****       -1.804**** 
                   (0.25)           (0.26)     
lnsig2u_cons       -3.600****       -3.564**** 
                   (0.48)           (0.60)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000     
Number of obs.      1219             1219____________________ 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;   
*** significant at 1%, **** significant at 0.1%. D=dropped by Stata due to collinearity 
Table 5. Random effects tobit panel data models with state dependency and 
unobservable heterogeneity for land leased out: Alternative model specifications without 
and with interaction variables________________________________________________ 
                   Lease out 1           Lease out 2            Lease out 3           Lease out 4   
llo_t1              0.646****        0.659****        0.507****        0.536**** 
                   (0.08)           (0.08)           (0.09)           (0.09)     
llo_t0              0.652****        0.630****        1.077****        1.105**** 
                   (0.09)           (0.09)           (0.16)           (0.15)     
landcerp            3.878*           1.271            3.159            2.331     
                   (2.35)           (2.57)           (2.62)           (2.58)     
conflict           -0.360           -0.324            0.428            0.639*    
                   (0.33)           (0.33)           (0.36)           (0.37)     
hhsex               1.111****        1.198**          1.246**          1.123*    
                   (0.31)           (0.58)           (0.58)           (0.58)     
hhedu              -0.574***        -0.546***        -0.403**         -0.403**   
                   (0.19)           (0.20)           (0.19)           (0.19)     
hhage               0.006           -0.022           -0.023           -0.022     
                   (0.01)           (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)     
adufem             -0.061           -0.061           -0.113           -0.109     
                   (0.15)           (0.15)           (0.15)           (0.15)     
adumale            -0.348***        -0.313**         -0.271**         -0.274**   
                   (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.13)     
tlu                -0.040           -0.050           -0.056           -0.063     
                   (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)     
oxen               -0.652***        -0.663***        -0.641***        -0.616***  
                   (0.21)           (0.21)           (0.20)           (0.20)     
own_hold            0.169****        0.175****        0.158****        0.157**** 
                   (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.03)     
d2000              -0.772           -0.546           -3.132*          -3.415*    
                   (0.94)           (0.93)           (1.76)           (1.81)     
certyears          -1.082           -0.977           -0.398           -0.327     
                   (0.81)           (0.80)           (0.27)           (0.27)     
certyear2           0.092            0.094                                       
                   (0.07)           (0.07)                                       
hhsexcerp                            1.717**          1.839**          2.042**   
                                    (0.86)           (0.84)           (0.84)     
hhsexcrtyr                          -0.307***        -0.312***        -0.326***  
                                    (0.11)           (0.10)           (0.10)     
hhagecerp                            0.038**          0.043**          0.042**   
                                    (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)     
d2003                D                D              -2.371**         -2.571**   
                                                     (1.07)           (1.10)     
llot0cerp                                            -0.674****       -0.907**** 
                                                     (0.16)           (0.21)     
villrmpart                                            3.304***                   
                                                     (1.26)                      
vilcerp                                               0.504            4.339***  
                                                     (1.52)           (1.34)     
llot0crtyr                                                             0.035     
                                                                      (0.03)     
villrmpd                                                               1.003**   
                                                                      (0.43)     
vilpdcrtyr                                                            -0.216***  
                                                                      (0.08)     
_cons              -3.249****       -1.907**         -3.272****       -2.776***  
                   (0.55)           (0.83)           (0.95)           (0.89)     
sigma_u_cons        0.028****        0.033****        0.517****        0.464**** 
                   (0.00)           (0.00)           (0.13)           (0.13)     
sigma_e_cons        2.741****        2.716****        2.560****        2.563**** 
                   (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.12)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000     
aic              2016.163         2030.255         2102.002         2104.227     
bic              2108.067         2137.477         2224.541         2236.977 
Number of obs.   1219             1219             1219             1219_________ 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%, **** 
significant at 0.1%. D=dropped by Stata due to collinearity 
Table 6. Random effects tobit panel data models with state dependency and 
unobservable heterogeneity for land leased in: Alternative model specifications without 
and with interaction variables__________________________________ 
                   Lease in 1             Lease in 2             Lease in 3____            
lli_t1              0.351***         0.329****        0.361**** 
                   (0.11)           (0.09)           (0.09)     
lli_t0              0.630****        1.662****        1.654**** 
                   (0.16)           (0.23)           (0.24)     
landcerp            2.674            2.004            2.252     
                   (2.72)           (2.50)           (2.51)     
conflict            0.027           -0.110           -0.123     
                   (0.37)           (0.36)           (0.38)     
hhsex              -2.259****       -2.200****       -2.252**** 
                   (0.52)           (0.48)           (0.48)     
hhedu               0.324*           0.312*           0.321*    
                   (0.19)           (0.17)           (0.17)     
hhage              -0.030***        -0.036****       -0.035**** 
                   (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)     
adufem             -0.208           -0.211           -0.194     
                   (0.18)           (0.17)           (0.17)     
adumale             0.226            0.221            0.199     
                   (0.15)           (0.14)           (0.14)     
tlu                 0.202***         0.223***         0.219***  
                   (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)     
oxen                0.676****        0.665****        0.683**** 
                   (0.19)           (0.19)           (0.19)     
own_hold            0.014           -0.005           -0.010     
                   (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)     
d2000               0.700            2.033            1.517     
                   (1.09)           (1.86)           (1.97)     
certyears           0.049            0.197            0.156     
                   (0.94)           (0.28)           (0.30)     
certyear2          -0.006                                       
                   (0.08)                                       
d2003                D               0.853            0.536     
                                    (1.14)           (1.20)     
llit0cerp                           -1.798****       -2.324**** 
                                    (0.28)           (0.41)     
villrmpart                           0.955                      
                                    (0.72)                      
vilcerp                                               1.763     
                                                     (1.52)     
llit0crtyr                                            0.113*    
                                                     (0.06)     
villrmpd                                              0.119     
                                                     (0.59)     
vilpdcrtyr                                           -0.126     
                                                     (0.10)     
_cons              -4.534****       -5.106****       -4.857**** 
                   (0.73)           (0.73)           (0.78)     
sigma_u_cons        1.162****        0.591****        0.485**** 
                   (0.30)           (0.10)           (0.09)     
sigma_e_cons        2.854****        2.820****        2.839**** 
                   (0.16)           (0.14)           (0.14)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000     
aic              2019.458         1983.859         1988.066     
bic              2111.362         2085.974         2105.500     
Number of obs.   1219             1219             1219_________ 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;   
*** significant at 1%, **** significant at 0.1%. D=dropped by Stata due to collinearity 
Table 7. Average partial effects from 
tobit model “Lease out 1”. 
Variable                  Mean__      
Llo_t1                  .0980613       
Llo_t0                  .0990403     
hhedu                  -.0871041     
hhage                   .0009846     
adu~m                  -.0091968     
adu~e                  -.0528721     
tlu                    -.0060786     
oxen                   -.0990679     
own_hold                .0256159     
Discrete change from 0 to 1: 
hhsex                   .1716712     
landcerp                .5261954     
conflict               -.0515099     
 
Table 8. Average partial effects from 
 tobit model “Lease in 1”. 
Variable                 Mean___   
lli_t1                  .0462412         
lli_t0                  .0831128     
hhedu                   .0427626     
hhage                  -.0039463     
adufem                 -.0273702     
adum~e                  .0298557     
tlu                     .0266419     
oxen                    .0890884     
own_hold                .0018276     
Discrete change from 0 to 1: 
hhsex                  -.1614679         
landcerp                .2094540     
conflict                .0035832     
 
Table 9. Average partial effects of land certificate on land leased out for male- and 
female-headed households that are non-participant and participant households in the 
rental market by year________________________________________________ 
Male-headed households 1997 2000 2003 2006
Non-participants APE 0.433 0.06 0.013 0.037
 SD 0.757 0.335 0.124 0.27
 N 215 216 186 162
 SE 0.052 0.023 0.009 0.021
 t-value 8.368 2.626 1.426 1.739
Participants APE 2.638 0.721 0.902 0.734
 SD 1.245 1.441 1.438 1.404
 N 51 56 41 45
 SE 0.176 0.194 0.227 0.212
 t-value 14.983 3.711 3.967 3.468
Female-headed households    
Non-participants APE 2.294 0.234 0.358 0.233
 SD 0.832 0.51 0.859 0.691
 N 17 8 42 51
 SE 0.208 0.193 0.134 0.098
 t-value 11.029 1.214 2.669 2.384
Participants APE 3.538 1.069 1.118 1.559
 SD 0.533 1.238 1.216 1.312
 N 22 27 39 41
 
SE 0.116 0.243 0.197 0.207
 
t-value 30.419 4.403 5.668 7.515
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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